Abstract: Semiotic objections to commodification hold that buying and selling certain goods and services is wrong because of what market exchange communicates, or because it violates the meaning of certain goods, services, and relationships. We argue such objections fail. The meaning of markets and of money is a contingent, socially-constructed fact. Cultures often impute meaning to markets in harmful, socially destructive, or costly ways. Rather than semiotic objections giving us reason to judge certain markets as immoral, the usefulness of certain markets gives us reason to judge certain semiotic codes as immoral.
D.
Paternalism: Some markets -e.g. in crystal meth or cigarettesmight cause people to make self-destructive choices.
E. Harm to Others: Some markets -e.g. in pit bulls or handgunsmight lead to greater violence or injury to others. F. Corruption: Certain markets-e.g. in Disney Princesses for one's daughters-will tend to cause us to develop defective preferences or character traits.
Debra Satz refers to those markets that generate "extreme revulsion" as noxious markets. 1 She says there is "an intuitive disgust or abhorrence to certain kinds of market transactions…" 2 Margaret Jane Radin describes the objects for sale on these markets as "contested commodities," 3 and insists that some things are "market-inalienable." 4 Contested commodities include markets in objects like organs and blood, sex, surrogacy, line-standing services 5 , and the like.
When critics of commodification discuss what should not be for sale, they intend to object specifically to buying, selling, or bartering certain goods and services, not simply to having them nor to exchanging them in nonmarket ways. They intend to identify cases where the wrongness of a market exchange in x originates in the market, not in the exchange nor in x, the object itself. They intend to defend an asymmetry: It is permissible to possess and exchange certain things, but impermissible to do so using markets. This asymmetry is what makes the anti-commodification thesis interesting, rather than trivial and facile. For of course if it is wrong to have or exchange x, then it is wrong to have a market in x, just as it would be wrong to make x the object of a gift. So, for instance, Michael Sandel thinks you may give away, but not 3 sell, your spot in line at Disney World. Elizabeth Anderson thinks your sister can carry your baby for free, but you should not pay a stranger to do so.
Richard Titmuss thinks blood can be given away, but ought not to be sold.
Everyone seems to agree that at least some such objections explain why we should not have markets in everything. Even die-hard libertarians say markets in stolen goods or slaves are wrong because they violate some people's rights.
However, nearly every philosopher and political theorist who writes about commodification raises an additional class of objections beyond A-F.
They advance symbolic objections, what we will call semiotic objections, to markets in certain goods and services. Sandel says, "markets don't only allocate goods; they also express… certain attitudes toward the goods being exchanged." 6 Semiotic objections are based on this idea. They take the following form:
G. Semiotics: Independently of non-communicative objections, to engage in a market in some good or service X is a form of symbolic expression that communicates the wrong motive, or the wrong attitude toward X, or expresses an attitude that is incompatible with the intrinsic dignity of X, or would show disrespect or irreverence for some practice, custom, belief, or relationship with which X is associated.
Semiotic objections rely upon the idea that markets in certain goods communicate, signal, express, or symbolize the wrong motive or attitude.
Market exchanges are a kind of language, these exchanges are part of a kind of social meaning system. Market activities come bundled with meaning.
Commodifying certain objects is disrespectful or degrading of those objects (or of something associated with those objects), or communicates selfish or other bad motives, because of a meaning that attaches to market activities.
Semiotic objections-as we identify them-are independent of worries about wrongful exploitation, misallocation, rights violations, self-destructive behavior, harm to others, or character corruption. Semiotic objections hold that even if no wrongful exploitation, misallocation, rights violation, and so on, is present in or the result of a market in some good or service, it would still be wrong to have a market in that good or service because such markets communicate or express bad motives or disrespectful attitudes.
For example, many people are convinced sex services or pornography should not be for sale because such sales are inherently degrading. 7 Many people think kidney sales disrespect the human body, even if there is no wrongful exploitation involved. Satz discusses a case where students at a university were paid to keep their rooms clean in order to impress prospective students and their parents. She is not worried about wrongful exploitation or deceptive advertising. Rather, she finds the transaction at odds with the kind of relationship a university should have with its students. 8 Anderson worries that paying women for surrogacy violates the intimacy of the pregnancy relationship.
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Some apparently semiotic objections to markets are parasitic on nonsemiotic objections. Some critics of sweatshop labor, for example, claim it communicates disrespect because it is exploitative. This is not a true semiotic One of our main responses will be to provide evidence that the meaning of markets and of money is, in general, a highly contingent, fluid, sociallyconstructed fact. There is little essential meaning to market exchanges or money. What market exchanges mean depends upon a culture's interpretative practices. We will argue that these interpretative practices are themselves subject to moral evaluation, and that there can be better or worse interpretive practices. In our view, cultures sometimes impute meaning to markets in harmful, socially destructive ways. Rather than giving us reason to avoid those markets, it gives us reason to revise the meaning we assign to these markets, or, if we can't, to conscientiously rebel against or ignore the meaning our society attaches to these markets.
This is a paper about ethics, not public policy. 
The Mere Commodity Objection
We begin with what we consider the weakest of the major semiotic objections. The Mere Commodity Objection holds that some things are not mere commodities. They have non-instrumental value that cannot be captured in their market price. To buy and sell these goods and services shows one regards these things as mere commodities and lacks a proper appreciation for their non-instrumental value. It is therefore wrong to buy and sell these goods or services.
The word "commodity" seems to suggest something that does not merit respect in itself, and so it seems to follow that to treat something as a commodity is to ignore its intrinsic value. For instance, Anderson says, A practice treats something as a commodity if its production, distribution, or enjoyment is governed by one or more norms distinctive to the market…. For example, in market transactions the will and desire of the parties determines the allocation between them of their freely alienable rights. Each party is expected to look after her own interests, neither party is expected to look after the interests of the other, or of third parties, except to the minimal extent required by law. 19 To think of something as a commodity in the sense above just is to regard it as having purely instrumental value, and in buying and selling that good, people are expected only to observe some minimal set of negative moral obligations. 20 If we define "commodity" this way, it becomes a trivial claim that thinking of something as a commodity is incompatible with thinking of that thing (or some practice associated with it) as deserving respect or reverence.
However, it is not a trivial claim that buying and selling an object is the same thing as viewing it as a commodity so defined. It is always an open question whether a person who buys or sells an object views the object as a commodity in Anderson's sense.
Let's say instead that a commodity is an object that is bought and sold on a market. To regard something as a commodity, then, is to think that it is something that may be bought and sold. To regard it as a mere commodity, meanwhile, is to think that you may buy and sell it, and to think the thing in question has no non-instrumental value, and is instead only an object for personal satisfaction.
In fact objects are routinely treated as commodities without the buyers or sellers considering those objects to be mere commodities. 22 Since the commodification debate primarily concerns whether it is permissible to exchange certain goods or services for money, we will by default consider all voluntary exchanges of goods and services for money part of the market. Now, some may wish to attach additional criteria for something to be called a "market", such as that market exchanges must involve purely selfish motivations, or that market actors must regard the exchanged object as lacking intrinsic value. As we just saw, this seems false-as a matter of fact, 
The Wrong Signal and Wrong Currency Objections
A person who offers things for sale or who purchases things on the market might believe that these things have non-instrumental value and must be treated with reverence or respect. However, the anti-commodification theorist may just respond that there is a difference between 1) regarding something as a mere commodity versus 2) treating it like a mere commodity.
The anti-commodification theorist could still argue that at least sometimes when we buy and sell certain things we treat the objects the wrong way, as if This objection rests on the fact that what we express through our words and actions is not simply a function of our intentions. If we were to visit certain foreign countries, we might give someone else the thumbs up with the intention of expressing approval, but might in fact express contempt. We should thus refrain from making that gesture in places where it will express contempt.
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A closely related objection holds that there are some cases where introducing money (or barter exchange) into a relationship offends or clashes with the relationship. Introducing cash payments or trades into a relationship is incompatible with the meaning of that relationship. Suppose we offered our romantic partners $100 to clean the house, watch the children, cook dinner, or have sex. They would be offended. Making such offers would express disrespectful attitudes or bad motives and would be incompatible with the kind of relationships we have.
What we call the Wrong Currency Objection begins with the premise that offering money for services tends to communicate estrangement. Since it can be wrong in some cases to communicate estrangement, it can be wrong to buy and sell services within certain relationships-such as between romantic partners, between fellow citizens, among friends. For instance,
Anderson complains that selling sex services corrupts the meaning of the sexual relationship, because the sexual partners in prostitution do not exchange the same kind of good. 23 Our basic response to both arguments will be to argue that when there are no non-semiotic objections to commodification, then the consequences of commodification set the main standard by which we should judge our culture's semiotics. That is, we will argue if there are no independent, non-semiotic objections to markets in certain goods or services, then the meaning of market exchanges in those goods and services is probably just a contingent, relative social construct. There is probably no essential meaning to market exchanges.
If certain markets express disrespect or selfish motives, in light of a culture's socially-constructed semiotics, but if those markets do or would lead to good outcomes (or if prohibiting those markets leads to bad outcomes), then (pro tanto) people in that culture should revise their social practices governing what counts as expressing disrespect or selfishness. Failure to do so-that is, taking our cultural practices for granted when they impose great costs-is itself morally misguided. We will further argue that if it's not possible or too difficult to revise the culture's social practices, individuals may conscientiously choose to reject their culture's social practices and instead participate in those contested markets. They will express disrespect or selfishness, but they will be justified, not merely excused, in doing so.
In short: our view is that when there is a clash between semiotics and consequences, consequences win. But we are not just saying that consequentialist arguments on behalf of markets trump or outweigh semiotic arguments against them. Rather, we will defend the stronger, more interesting claim that if there are no other deontic concerns about markets aside from semiotics, if there are no worries about wrongful exploitation, harm to others, rights violations and so on, then consequentialist considerations allow us to judge the semiotics of market transactions.
The Meaning of Money and Markets is a Contingent Social Construct
In this section, we present sociological and anthropological evidence that that the meaning of money and markets is a contingent social construct.
Sandel, Anderson, and Carol Pateman claim in contrast that some markets necessarily signal disrespect-that it is not a mere contingent social convention that such commodification signals disrespect-even when these markets do not involve exploitation, harm, and so on, and even when market agents do not have any bad attitudes or motives. 24 Debra Satz describes Patemen and Anderson as advocating an "essentialist thesis" when they claim that "reproductive labor is by its nature something that should not be bought or sold." They might be right; we will consider their essentialist semiotic arguments in more depth later. But for now, we want to examine some sociological and anthropological evidence that the meaning of markets is contingent and socially-constructed.
There are facts about what symbols, words, and actions signal or express respect. But-when there are no worries about exploitation, harm, rights, and so on-these facts appear to vary from culture to culture. Consider They agreed that everyone has a moral obligation to signal respect for their dead fathers. Each group had developed a system of linguistic and cultural norms within which they could fulfill this obligation. Sandel asks you to imagine that on your wedding day, your best man's speech brings you to tears. But he then asks you to imagine you discover your best man paid a professional speechwriter to write it for him. Sandel thinks you would be upset: wedding toasts are "an expression of friendship,"
and so should be written oneself.
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But consider a similar case: imagine that it's your father's funeral.
Hundreds of people gather to mourn his passing. Now, suppose your recently widowed mother learns that many of those mourners are not friends, family, or acquaintances, but strangers whom you paid to be there. How might she react? Well, if she's Romanian, or Chinese, or lived in England during the time of Charles Dickens' Oliver Twist, she might thank you for being a dutiful son or daughter. In some cultures, it's normal and expected that one will hire professional mourners for a funeral.
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We can easily imagine a Twin Earth with a Twin America. In Twin America, imagine, best men usually spend lavish amounts of money to buy the fanciest, most eloquent speech from the most famous speechwriters they can. In Twin America, to write one's own speech would be seen as cheap and uncaring. In Twin America, it's expected that the father or mother of the bride must bake the wedding cake, rather than buy it from a bakery, as we do. 
Why We Should Not Take Semiotics for Granted
Cultures imbue certain actions, words, and objects with symbolic meaning. In light of those codes, some behaviors will signify morally bad meanings. But this is not cost-free. We do not have to accept these codes as
is. Instead, we should ask whether we have reason to maintain, modify, or drop the codes altogether, or whether we have reason to conscientiously rebel against or ignore those codes. That will depend in great part upon the consequences and opportunity costs of using such codes. In general, if the consequences of using one set of signals turns out, on net, to be bad or costly, then we should stop using that set of signals. That is, we should subject our semiotics to a kind of cost-benefit analysis, and drop semiotics that fail this analysis.
Certain forms of symbolism are socially destructive-they cause great harm. Others could have high opportunity costs-they could prevent us from 21 doing things that would be beneficial. Either case gives us strong pro tanto grounds to revise the current practice or at least to stop complying with it. So, for instance, if a culture stigmatizes contraception as expressing contempt for life, and if the stigma disincentivizes use of contraception, then it will tend to perpetuate poverty and low status for women. If a culture regards anesthesia as expressing contempt for a divine will, and this leads to avoidance of anasthetics, then people will suffer needlessly. And if a culture regards life insurance as expressing the desire to profit from death, leading to fewer parents opting to get insured, then it thereby tends to leave orphans at the mercy of charity.
To illustrate, consider that the word "cat" really does refer to cats and not to dogs. But it's meaning is a social convention. The word "cat" could have signified nothing or something else. In light of that, imagine we discoveredbecause of bizarre laws of physics-that every time we emit the sounds "I respect you as an end in yourself!" or "Some things have a dignity, not a price!" to others, an infant died. We had better then stop talking that way. If it also turned out that every time we emit the sounds "I despise you and hope you suffer forever in Hell" a person was magically cured of cancer, we would have every reason to start talking that way.
If we discovered these facts, we would have compelling moral grounds to modify our semiotics. We should, if we could, change the meaning of the English language, modifying it such that "I despise you and hope you suffer in
Hell" did not have negative meaning. We might even make it an informal greeting. If we refused to change our practices-saying instead that it is just 22 plain wrong to talk in certain ways-we would act disrespectfully. We would show a lack of concern for life, what really matters more.
To take a real-life example, consider that some cultures developed the idea that the best way to respect the dead was to eat their bodies. In those cultures, it really was a (socially-constructed) fact, regardless of one's intentions, that failing to eat the dead expressed disrespect, while eating To review, the argument for organ sales begins by noting there is a huge shortage in organs. People are simply not willing to give away the organs others need. The government sets the legal price of organs at $0, far below the implicit market equilibrium price. Thus, an economist might say, of course there is a shortage-whenever the legal price of a good is set below the equilibrium price, the quantity demanded will exceed the quantity supplied.
Many philosophers and economists thus think that markets in organs will eliminate the shortage. For the sake of argument, suppose they are right.
Suppose markets in organs make sick people healthier, make poor people richer, and prevent hundreds of thousands of deaths per year. 37 Suppose also that we are able to design or regulate such markets in such a way that no wrongful exploitation or misallocation takes place. they draw information from diffuse and diverse sources, and 2) they reward people for being right and punish them for being wrong. 38 PAM never got off the ground-public outrage killed it. As Sandel says, the idea of "buying a stake in someone else's death" carries a certain "moral ugliness." 39 Senator Ron Wyden said PAM is "ridiculous" and "grotesque", while senator Byron Dorgan called it "offensive". 40 These critics did not deny PAM would work; they thought it was immoral for semiotic reasons. 41 It may be that in our culture, given the meanings we have constructed, to bet on a terrorist attack is translated as callously buying a stake in someone else's death, just as in the past (given our culture's former semiotics) to buy life insurance for one's family really was interpreted as a disgusting act that commodified death. However, if PAM worked as intended, it would have saved many lives. If so, then having a culture that sees PAM as vile and offensive is itself vile and offensive-one of the misguided features of our culture is that we are willing to let people die because we imbued certain acts with negative symbolic meaning. 42 Our concern here is not whether PAM would really work better than the alternatives. Instead, our view is that if PAM 25 worked as advertised, then we should not forbid it on semiotic grounds.
Instead, we should modify the semiotics surrounding PAM (again, provided there are no independent non-semiotic objections to PAM).
Our semiotics can have more small-scale opportunity costs. Even if a market in certain goods does not save lives, when we see that people choose to participate in that market this usually means it has good consequences for the participants. It suggests that they regard themselves as benefitting from the exchange, and that to eliminate this opportunity for exchange would thereby eliminate their most-preferred option. We should thus be cautious in imbuing too many things with negative symbolic meaning to avoid unduly constraining options.
We do not claim that it is easy to revise our semiotics. And it is a complicated question just what responsibility individuals have in revising their
culture's semiotics. But we do not think these complications amount to an objection to our thesis. Consider, in parallel: feminists argue that Western semiotics infuse gendered meanings onto a wide range of objects, practices, words, colors, careers, behaviors, and so on. They argue that these semiotics are harmful to both women and men, and thus claim we should modify our semiotics. We doubt anyone holds that because it is difficult to modify such semiotics, the feminist critique is therefore wrong. Similarly, we doubt that anyone holds that because determining the responsibilities of individuals is difficult, the feminist critique is wrong. One might argue that there are moral costs to changing our semiotics, and these considerations can count against changing them. We can accept this point, but note that similar remarks also apply to feminist arguments for changing the semiotics of gender. So, without exploring these issues at great length, we just note that whatever response feminists have to these purported objections, we should have as well.
Suppose instead that it is impossible to change the semiotics of one's culture. Suppose that a culture has a code of meaning about what it takes to signal respect or good motives, but this code of meaning is harmful, destructive, or has an unduly high opportunity cost. Suppose also that this code of meaning cannot be revised-while it's contingent that the culture has this code of meaning, the culture is so rigid that they will never change.
Must one then adhere to that code, refraining from actions that express disrespect or bad motives? We don't see why. Instead, it seems more plausible that one may conscientiously reject or ignore the code. To see why,
consider some examples outside of the market: seems more plausible that he may conscientiously refuse to participate in the practice, even though that will offend others. His disregard of the semiotics is not merely excused, but justified.
3. It's a contingent fact that some cultures used to regard anesthesia as expressing religious disrespect. Suppose you were part of a rigid culture that would never abandon this aversion to anesthesia. Now suppose your child is ill and needs surgery. Are you obligated to refrain from anesthetizing your child in order to avoid signalling disrespect in your culture? Here, again, it seems more plausible that you may conscientiously choose to anesthetize your child. You will end up expressing disrespect, but you would be justified in doing so.
Note that we said you may conscientiously choose to reject the code of meaning. This should be distinguished from conscientious objection: We don't make the stronger claim that you must engage in some sort of public protest, or that you should bear punishment for your actions in the hopes that your martyrdom will induce others to change.
Note also that we are not just saying in cases 1-3 above that consequences trump symbolic concerns. We are not saying that there is a pro tanto duty to comply with one's culture's codes of meaning, but this is outweighed by a duty to avoid harm. Rather, we're saying that in these cases the duty to comply disappears or is silenced, not merely defeated or outweighed.
Now, let's apply this kind of reasoning to markets. Suppose our culture just so happens to regard organ sales as disrespectful, though it doesn't have to. It could think of organ sales as no different from selling labor. Suppose our culture is rigid; there is no possibility of getting people to change their minds.
Should we thus refrain from participating in organ markets, in order to avoid signalling disrespect? Our view is that one may instead conscientiously refuse to participate in the semiotics of one's culture. If most Americans reject organ sales on semiotic grounds, but organ sales would save lives, then some Americans may conscientiously refuse to abide by American semiotics. They are not merely excused, but justified.
Semiotic Essentialism and Minding our Manners
We have presented empirical evidence that in the absence of wrongful exploitation, harm, corruption, and so on, the meaning of markets is contingent and socially-constructed. Westerners right now happen to see markets and money as profane, amoral, impersonal, and so on, but If so, then the market plays no essential role in explaining the purported wrongness of prostitution-it would be wrong for the prostitutes to
give sex away, not just to charge for it. Radin's complaint is not properly a complaint about commodification. Consider: We agree that it's wrong to buy and sell child pornography. But, we add, it would also be wrong to give away child porn for free, or even to have it, period. Buying and selling didn't make the transaction wrong; rather, it is wrong because one should not have it at all, regardless of whether money changes hands. Radin doesn't have a semiotic objection to markets in sex; she has at most a semiotic objection to all forms of non-intimate sex, including casual sex.
Anderson complains that in prostitution, the buyer gives the prostitute cash, while the prostitute gives the buyer her body. The sexual partners in prostitution do not exchange the same kind of good. 45 And so, Anderson seems to conclude, the buyer necessarily treats the prostitute as a mere object. But, as far as we can tell, Anderson does not have an argument about why, in the special case of sex, one must exchange the same kind of good on pain of treating the prostitute as a mere object. This is not immoral in other cases, such as when Anderson directly exchanges a philosophy lecture for an honorarium, or when she exchanges her teaching for a salary. And, as Satz notes, all labor involves one person purchasing to some degree the use and control of another person's body, such as what the employee will wear, whom they will touch, when they will sleep, where they will be, what they will eat. it more than doubled. 47 In effect, by introducing a small fine, the Israeli daycare transformed what was seen as a significant moral transgression into just another financial transaction-a price instead of a penalty.
Sandel and Satz view this as evidence of the badness of certain markets. 48 But we think they misdiagnose the problem. There is nothing morally wrong or inherently corrupting with charging people for picking up their kids late. Plenty of daycares do so without any deleterious results.
Rather, the problem here is that these daycare centers seem to have had more than just an arms-length relationship with the parents. pickups were a serious problem, but if they're only charging a few dollars for them, they must not be that serious."
To fully respond to semiotic essentialism, we would have to collect all purportedly essentialist complaints like these and refute them one by one. We simply do not have the space to do that in this essay, though we think the kinds of responses we just gave work in each case. At best, we can explain why we are skeptical of a few such arguments.
Civic Respect
Now let's consider the issue of civic respect. Above, we argued that many interpretive practices are highly contingent and culturally-specific. Even so, the anti-commodification theorist can respond: True, it is contingent that we drive on the right-hand side of the road around here, and it is true that the words "I disrespect you" contingently communicate disrespect in our language, but this doesn't change the fact that, once these practices get under way, we have reason to drive according to the social convention, and work within the meaning conventions of language around here. In short, the fact that, around here, buying a wedding speech, selling women's reproductive labor, and so on, is interpreted as disrespectful may be sufficient reason to denounce these practices. We should not give each other the middle finger around here, because around here the middle finger signals 34 disrespect. And that's true despite the fact that it's contingent, culturallyspecific, and not written into the moral fabric of the universe.
In response, we can just accept that people have at least a prima facie duty to obey the local norms of good manners because they have a duty to express respect for one another. There are cases where buying and selling certain goods is impolite-it communicates disrespect, given that culture's contingent semiotics. There could be cases where refraining from participating in these markets bears no significant cost or opportunity cost, and causes no significant harm. If so, then people should refrain from participating in those markets.
While we concede this, it is not a victory for semiotic arguments. We accept that manners matter. All things considered, we should have good manners, and play along with the manners of those around us. We should keep up the good manners when the good manners are good and useful, or at least not harmful. But, as we argued above, we should reject these systems of manners when they are harmful or have high opportunity costs. We are not saying that manners have no hold on us, but are saying instead that we should replace or conscientiously reject codes of manners when these codes are dysfunctional, costly, and harmful. So, at this point, we're just haggling over the price of manners.
The semiotic objections we considered were intended to be powerful moral arguments for limiting the scope of the market. We have reduced what appeared to be significant moral arguments against commodification to issues of mere manners. Semiotic objections have force only in the way manners have force. They hold only for minor markets of little consequence, only in cases where the cost of forbearance from the markets is not so high as to justify modifying our manners or conscientiously rejecting the code of manners. We take this, then, to be a vindication of Martha Nussbaum's claims when she wrote that "[a]n account of the actual social meaning of a practice is… just a door that opens onto the large arena of moral and legal evaluation… Social meaning does no work on its own: it offers an invitation to normative moral and political philosophy." 49 Again, we note that the argument we've presented does not just imply that the bad consequences of forbidding certain markets sometimes trump a deontological concern that such markets would express disrespect. We've made the much more interesting argument that in the absence of other deontological or non-communicative concerns, pure semiotic objections to markets fail, because consequentialist considerations allow us to put a price on and judge codes of semiotics. And just as we may often times shrug and say "manners schmanners," so we may with equal aplomb often times say "semiotics schemiotics." practices-a culture's semiotics-can themselves be judged by the consequences they produce. In many cases, we are morally obligated to revise our semiotics in order to allow for greater commodification. We ought to revise our interpretive schemas whenever the costs of holding that schema are significant, without counterweighted benefits. It is itself morally objectionable to maintain a meaning system that imbues a practice with negative meanings when that practice would save or improve lives, reduce or alleviate suffering, and so on.
We conclude by suggesting that more work should be done on the psychology underlying semiotic objections to markets. Notice the language that anti-commodification theorists use. Satz calls certain markets "noxious" and says they have "great distate". 51 Sandel describes certain markets as "repugnant", "morbid", "distasteful," or as having "moral ugliness" or "moral tawdriness". 52 He agrees with certain editorialists that auctioning access to national parks is a kind of "sacrilege" because such things are "sacred" and worthy of "awe". 53 He cites Senator Barbara Boxer calling information markets on terrorism "sick". 54 Benjamin Barber describes anti-consumerist asceticism as "cleansing". 55 And so on.
Notice that they use visceral language, as well as language invoking purity and notions of holiness. They sometimes describe the market as inherently gross and profane, and as intruding onto the sacred. To put certain things on the market is much like washing hamburger grease off your fingers with holy water or blowing one's nose with pages from the Bible. This language suggests that many semiotic objections are rationalizations of disgust. Many people have a deep emotional aversion to certain trades. They find certain trades repugnant. But we have to ask whether disgust reactions are reliable guides to right and wrong. We also have to ask whether using these disgust reactions as the basis of a social code about the sacred and profane is worth the cost.
